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Abstract
The article proves a long-lasting legacy of Martin Krygier’s work on the rule of law. 
Taking the European Union as a case study, and specifically—the recent infringe-
ment action concerning the judicial independence in Poland, the article addresses 
the point (teleos) of the rule of law, the conditions the institutions need to fulfill to 
make this point, and institutional measures that help to meet these conditions in the 
EU as a whole and its Member States. It argues that the rule of law can be achieved 
via various paths, but there is general agreement on when its basic elements such 
as the guarantees against arbitrary removal of judges are missing. Therefore, it con-
cludes, the EU does not need to determine the anatomy of national institutions, but it 
needs to remain vigilant against such modifications that put at risk the effectiveness 
of EU law, and the judicial protection of individual rights in particular.
1 Introduction
The illuminating work of Martin Krygier on the legality, teleology, and sociology 
of the rule of law has a lasting legacy. It becomes highly relevant in times when 
the rule of law is systematically misused or even abused by populist leaders and 
governments. In this respect, the European Union is an interesting case study—it 
is a supranational organization founded on the rule of law, which includes Member 
States with an established rule of law tradition as well as States where the rule of 
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law is relatively new, while a systematic disregard of the rule of law in any Member 
State is likely to threaten the stability of the entire European integration project.
The diversity of legal traditions, conventions, and societies in the EU has always 
been a challenge to its unity. Currently, it also leads to a paradox—on the one 
hand, the European Union needs to respect the national constitutional traditions of 
the Member States,1 and on the other hand, it has to remain vigilant with regard to 
abuses of the rule of law.2 Therefore, it is pertinent to ask whether there is one defi-
nition of the rule of law within the EU that is common to all EU Member States, or 
whether the EU allows divergent understandings of the concept and recognizes that 
different institutional designs may serve the purpose of the rule of law equally well.
In this regard Martin Krygier’s work is helpful in exploring the multiple dimen-
sions of the rule of law conundrum, but also to provide legitimacy to legal actions 
aimed at resolving the current crisis in the EU. Specifically, the three questions he 
asks—why?, what?, and how? (Krygier 2001, p. 28)—should be revisited in order to 
address the point (teleos) of the rule of law, the conditions that the institutions need 
to fulfil to make this point, and institutional measures that help to meet these condi-
tions in the particular circumstances of the EU as a whole and its Member States.
While the teleos of the rule of law is generally easy to establish, the “what” and 
“how” questions lend themselves to local solutions. Still, it is clear that certain local 
solutions should not be accepted in the EU as they thwart the realization of the com-
mon purpose (especially if they divert from the original design that was approved of 
in the process of EU accession3). The realization of the purpose of the rule of law is 
at risk when national measures generate a fear of oppression or provide room for an 
unpredictable exercise of power. Hence, in essence, the purpose of the rule of law is 
to reduce fear (distrust) and to facilitate cooperation (Krygier 2006, p. 134).
Although one universal, institution-based answer to what the rule of law is seems 
to be implausible (both in the EU and beyond), there are basic elements of the 
rule of law structure, or “anatomy” to use Kryger’s words, that are required at the 
national level. Following this approach, the EU does not have to start with a list 
of norms, institutions, and practices related to the rule of law to be installed in the 
Member States, but only to check whether they serve the purpose of the rule of law.
Ultimately, the purpose of EU actions with regard to the rule of law is to guar-
antee the effectiveness of EU law against intimidation by the national authorities, 
the caprices and arbitrariness of decision-makers, unfair procedures, corruption, 
informal power structures, and the like. Notably, in order to tackle rule of law vio-
lations in the Member States the EU has an entire arsenal of means at its disposal 
(Pech and Kochenov 2019). However, we argue that legal actions seem to be the 
most adequate.
1 Article 4(2) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU).
2 The rule of law as a common value is explicitly mentioned in Article 2 TEU.
3 Since 1993 the rule of law has been part of the Copenhagen (accession) criteria defining the eligibility 
of a country to join the European Union.
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2  The EU’s Rule of Law Toolkit
The phenomenon of rule of law backsliding (Pech and Scheppele 2017, p. 10) 
received increased attention when a blatant disregard of rule of law standards 
became evident in two Member States—Hungary (in 2010) and Poland (in 2015). 
Although each case involving a rule of law violation is different, what distinguishes 
such cases from other breaches of Treaty law is that the government responsible 
for dismantling the rule of law does not acknowledge problematic legal measures or 
policies as a breach. Instead it is likely to justify such measures as part of its national 
constitutional identity (Śledzińska-Simon and Ziółkowski 2017).
The EU has two main options to address problems with the rule of law in the 
Member States—political and legal. The political response may trigger the Article 7 
TEU mechanism, while legal action may take the form of infringement proceedings 
pursuant to Article 258 TFEU. Infringement proceedings are simultaneously nar-
rower and broader than Article 7 procedures. While the former must involve an EU 
law element, the latter may also cover matters falling outside the scope of EU law. 
Yet, the infringement procedure may be employed to tackle any failure within EU 
law of whatever gravity, whereas the Article 7 TEU mechanism is there to address 
a “serious” or a “serious and persistent” breach of the values enshrined in Article 2 
TEU, including the rule of law. Taking into account the nature of such a breach, the 
two actions appear to be complementary since “in the case of the infraction proce-
dure, the failure is more limited and circumstantial, whereas in the context of Article 
7 TEU, the breach becomes systematic” (Hillion 2016).
We claim that political and legal actions not only could, but should be initiated at 
the same time. While Article 7 TEU on its own may not be effective in halting rule 
of law violations, it may provide legitimacy for the Court of Justice when ruling on 
such cases (Buras and Knauch 2018). We see a great potential in applying infringe-
ment procedures against systemic violations of the rule of law to ensure respect for 
the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
3  Rule of Law Infringement Procedures
We argue that there is a great potential in the infringement procedure to tackle rule 
of law issues in the Member States, provided that the following rules are applied.
First, the European Commission should call a spade a spade and explicitly rec-
ognize the rule of law problem. It should not misconstrue such cases as incidental 
breaches of EU law, but take into account the gravity of the harm and the conse-
quences of the rule of law violations for the entire legal system.
Second, the European Commission should not waste time and postpone its legal 
actions, while a Member State openly violates the rule of law. Whereas dialogue and 
tolerance are European virtues, experience has taught us that there is no reason to 
engage in a lengthy discursive process with a government charged with rule of law 
backsliding.
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Third, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) should automatically 
prioritise and accelerate infringement cases involving a rule of law element. This 
proposition builds upon the pilot judgment procedure of the European Court of 
Human Rights. We argue that all infringement procedures in which the Commission 
invites the CJEU to deal with a systemic problem caused by a rule of law viola-
tion should be expedited to avoid more harm. Once an infringement case has an 
identifiable rule of law element, it should automatically be decided in accelerated 
proceedings.
Fourth, interim measures may be used to put an immediate end to rule of law 
violations that can culminate in grave and irreversible harm. We argue that even 
an accelerated process will often not be sufficiently expeditious to prevent a sys-
temic violation of the rule of law. In cases where an infringement procedure is pend-
ing, the European Commission should request, if relevant, interim measures to be 
ordered by the CJEU, in line with the precautionary principle. In the past interim 
measures became very effective after the CJEU had decided that penalty payments 
would be imposed against the Member State in question if it failed to comply with 
the order both immediately and fully (C-441/17 Commission v Poland).
Fifth, a periodic review mechanism on democracy, the rule of law, and funda-
mental rights (the DRF monitoring and enforcement mechanism) should be estab-
lished in the EU to allow a contextual analysis of the Members States’ national laws 
and policies on the basis of a scientifically proven methodology, objective standards 
and equal treatment. It could signal to the Commission when to start rule of law 
infringement procedures or whether it is necessary to request interim measures. Fur-
thermore, it could allow the EU to act promptly and to suspend the application of 
EU laws based on mutual recognition, and thus relieve the courts of this burden. It 
could further indicate when mutual trust can be re-established thereby removing this 
matter from the courts.
4  Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law Anatomy 
in Commission v Poland
In the recent case against Poland the Commission alleged that the lowering of the 
retirement age for Supreme Court judges from 70 to 65 without a meaningful transi-
tional period and granting the President of Poland the discretion to extend the active 
judicial service of Supreme Court judges was a violation of EU law (C-619/18 
R Commission v Poland). The legal claim was based on Article 19(1) TFEU and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Commission alleged that the 
new law concerning the Supreme Court was in breach of the principle of judicial 
independence and, in particular, the principle of the irremovability of judges, which 
form the core of the rule of law.
On 19 October 2018 the Court issued its (provisional) interim order. It mandated 
a retrospective suspension of the Act on the Supreme Court with regard to the First 
President of the Supreme Court as well as the forcibly retired judges of both the 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. This order was a special 
kind of order. First, it was issued to suspend a legislative act of a Member State, and 
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not an act of the EU institutions. Second, contrary to the established case law, it was 
meant to restore the status of judges from before the infringement action was lodged 
(and a final decision of the Court rendered). Third, it was issued in an urgent proce-
dure, which allows the President of the Court to grant the application of an interim 
measure before hearing the party concerned.
The interim measure had considerable domestic influence. On 21 November 2018 
the Polish Parliament adopted amendments that restored the previous retirement age 
for active judges and declared that their service had not been interrupted. The law 
also removed the power of the President of the Republic to grant permission to con-
tinue judicial service after the judges in question had reached retirement age. These 
changes notwithstanding, the infringement proceedings against Poland continued 
before the Court because at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion 
of the Commission, the impugned provisions were still in force.
According to the Commission, the concept of effective legal protection must be 
interpreted in connection with the right to an effective remedy. The Commission 
asserted that judicial independence, as an essential part of the fundamental right to a 
fair trial, is no longer guaranteed if a national measure affects that the independence 
of a national court. The requirement “concerns not only the way in which an indi-
vidual case is conducted, but also the way in which the justice system is organised” 
(para. 36). The consequence of a national measure generally affecting the independ-
ence of the national courts is that an effective legal remedy is no longer guaranteed, 
inter alia when those courts interpret and apply EU law.
Although the organization of the justice system is beyond the EU’s competence, 
the requirement of judicial independence is a key to provide effective legal pro-
tection in the areas covered by EU law. More specifically, the Court reiterated its 
position expressed in earlier case law, according to which the Member States shall 
comply with obligations stemming from EU law even if they exercise their exclu-
sive competences. Therefore, the obligation to ensure effective legal protection in 
the fields covered by Union law entails the duty to preserve the independence of the 
Supreme Court, which is entrusted with the task of interpreting and applying EU 
law.
In this case, the rule of law was analysed in relation to the requirement of effec-
tive judicial protection. In this context, the Court recalled that the EU is based on 
mutual trust and the judicial system, involving special procedures (like the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure) to facilitate dialogue between the courts and, ultimately, to 
ensure the full effect and autonomy of EU law. These findings answer the “why” 
question as they explain the point of having the requirement of effective judicial 
protection.
The “what” question is answered by reference to the requirement of judicial inde-
pendence that needs to be secured in any court or tribunal within the EU. Hence, 
the national provisions governing the composition, the organisational structure, and 
the working methods of the Supreme Court should ensure that it meets the inde-
pendence requirement. That requirement is a basic element of the right to effec-
tive judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair trial. In this regard, the 
Court is less concerned about the scope of application of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights, but about the realization of the individual right to challenge the legality 
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of any decision or other national measure concerning the application of an EU act 
as far as they are concerned (C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 
and C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of 
justice)). At this point, the Court explained that the external aspect of judicial inde-
pendence entails specific guarantees against any arbitrary removal from office. Yet, 
when referring to the principle of irremovability, the Court admitted that it may be 
subject to limitations provided that they are justified by a legitimate aim and are 
proportionate.
In this case, the Court did not determine the content of national norms but the 
basic conditions which need to be fulfilled to ensure judicial independence. The 
Court certainly did not refer to how the principle of irremovablity is best achieved 
and neither did it indicate institutional measures that best fit particular social cir-
cumstances. Instead it examined whether the national measure which lowered the 
retirement age for active judges could be justified. In this regard, the Court expressed 
doubts as to whether the measure had an objective justification. Contrary to the 
Polish government that claimed that the measure served the standardization of the 
retirement age and improved the age balance, the CJEU was left with an impression 
that it had been adopted in order to exclude a predetermined group of judges from 
the Supreme Court (para. 85). In addition, it also found that the chosen measure was 
not suitable to serve the declared purpose and was disproportionate (paras. 90–91).
The second challenge to the law was resolved on a slightly different ground. The 
Commission challenged the national law with regard to the power of the President of 
the Republic to extend the period of service for judges who reached the new retire-
ment age. In this regard, the Court underlined that “it is for the Member States alone 
to decide whether or not they will authorise such an extension to the period of judi-
cial activity beyond normal retirement age, the fact remains that, where those Mem-
ber States choose such a mechanism, they are required to ensure that the conditions 
and the procedure to which such an extension is subject are not such as to under-
mine the principle of judicial independence.” (para. 111). For the Court, the solu-
tion adopted in Poland gave rise to doubts as to “the imperviousness of the judges 
concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to any interests 
before them.” (para. 118). As a result, the Court found that the Member State in 
question had failed to comply with the obligation to provide effective judicial pro-
tection with regard to both challenges.
5  Conclusions
A mature constitutional system, built on the principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
and fundamental rights, presupposes the existence of robust precautionary meas-
ures against anti-constitutional tendencies and forces. These are designed to protect 
democracy against a ‘constitutional coup d’état’, which may replace a constitutional 
government with an autocratic one. The blueprint for rule of law backsliding entails 
that election laws are curbed, constitutional courts are compromised, ordinary 
judges are unduly influenced, media pluralism is destroyed, participatory democracy 
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is dismantled, civil society is harassed and several fundamental rights are denied. To 
prevent this from happening the European institutions need to make use of preven-
tive tools because once a constitutional regime is compromised, the chances that it 
can be restored are slim.
Should judicial independence be under threat in some Member States, we might 
arrive at a situation where the EU harbours countries that would not qualify for EU 
membership if they applied today. In addition, as Kochenov and Bárd (2018) have 
demonstrated, basic EU principles, such as autonomy, primacy and mutual trust, 
will be jeopardised unless EU law embraces the rule of law as an institutional ideal 
and takes Article 2 TEU values to heart in the context of the day-to-day functioning 
of the Union.
When it comes to the actual assessment of the situation on the ground, we 
acknowledge that the rule of law can be attained via various paths, but there is gen-
eral agreement on when its basic elements, such as the guarantees against the arbi-
trary removal of judges, are missing. Therefore, the EU does not need to determine 
the anatomy of national institutions, but it needs to remain vigilant with regard to 
such modifications that put at risk the effectiveness of EU law, and the judicial pro-
tection of individual rights in particular. This is essential both for the protection of 
the fundamental rights of individuals, but also for the protection of judges or other 
public officials as a special category of right-holders.
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